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In an opinion that addressed many areas of 
criminal law, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland outlined in 
Ware v. State, 348 Md. 19, 702 
A.2d 699 (1997), why the State 
had committed a Brady violation 
for failing to disclose that its key 
witness had a pending motion 
for reconsideration of his own 
sentence. As a result, the court 
reversed the defendant's 
conviction because the State 
failed to notify him that Brady 
material existed, and was 
available in public court files. 
Darris Ware was sentenced 
to death after being convicted of 
two counts of first degree 
murder for killing Bettina Krista 
Gentry and her friend Cynthia 
Allen. Prior to trial, Ware filed a 
Request for Discovery and a 
Motion to Produce Documents. 
When he received no response, 
he filed a Supplemental 
Discovery Motion to Compel 
Disclosure of Existence and 
Substance of Promise of 
Immunity, Leniency, or 
Preferential Treatment Offered 
to Any State's Witness, 
requesting the disclosure of any 
preferential treatment offered to 
a State's witness. In early 
December of 1994, a hearing 
was held in Anne Arundel 
County Circuit Court to address 
Ware's Motion to Compel 
Discovery. At the hearing, 
defense counsel expressed 
concern about the State's key 
witness, Edward Anderson, who 
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was serving a life sentence for 
first degree murder. After the 
State testified that it knew of no 
preferential treatment offered to 
Anderson in exchange for his 
willingness to testify at Ware's 
trial, Judge Lawrence 
Rushworth denied Ware's 
Motion to Compel Disclosure. 
Prior to Ware's trial, 
Anderson filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration of Sentence in 
Baltimore County. Before his 
hearing, the State's Attorney 
prosecuting Ware's case wrote 
a letter about Anderson's 
willingness to testify at Ware's 
trial to the State's Attorney 
handling Anderson's Motion for 
Reconsideration of Sentence. 
When Anderson's hearing was 
held in April of 1995, Judge 
Joseph F. Murphy held his 
decision on the motion sub curia 
in order to await the outcome of 
the Ware trial. In addition, the 
court decided that the State's 
Attorney's letter about 
Anderson's willingness to testify 
at Ware's trial should not be 
made part of the court file for 
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Anderson's own safety. 
At trial, the question of 
whether there were any deals 
between the State and 
Anderson came up again, but 
the matter was not resolved until 
Ware's Motion For A New Trial. 
Before Anderson was cross-
examined at Ware's trial, the 
court asked the State whether 
Anderson had been offered 
leniency in exchange for his 
testimony. The State replied 
that they had informed 
Anderson that if his testifying put 
him in any danger in jail that the 
State would do what they could 
to protect him. War e ' s 
counsel finally learned about 
Anderson's Motion for 
Reconsideration of Sentence in 
November 1995, after Ware had 
been convicted. At that point, 
he supplemented his Motion for 
a New Trial with the additional 
allegation that the State had 
committed a Brady violation by 
not informing Ware of the 
State's involvement in 
Anderson's Motion for 
Reconsideration of Sentence. 
After Ware's trial, the State 
wrote a letter to Judge Murphy, 
informing him that Anderson had 
appeared as a witness for the 
State in the Ware trial and had 
been truthful and cooperative. 
Despite these communications 
between the State's Attorneys in 
Ware's case and Anderson's 
case, the court denied Ware's 
Motion for a New Trial, finding 
that the information that Ware 
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was seeking was available in the 
court files and could have been 
found through diligent 
investigation. 
Initially, Ware was indicted 
by a Grand Jury in Anne Arundel 
County on two counts of first 
degree murder, two counts of 
the use of a handgun in the 
commission of a felony, and two 
counts of the use of a handgun 
in the commission of a crime of 
violence. After the State filed a 
notice to seek the death penalty, 
the case was removed to the 
Circuit Court for Howard County 
for trial. On September 11, 
1995, a jury found Ware guilty 
on all counts, and sentenced 
him to death. After the denial of 
Ware's Motion for a New Trial, 
he appealed the decision to the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland. 
The court reversed the 
judgments against Ware and 
remanded the case for a new 
trial. The court found merit in 
Ware's challenge that the State 
had failed to disclose requested 
material under Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963). 
Ware v. State, 348 Md. 19,37, 
702 A.2d 699, 708. Brady held 
"that the suppression by the 
prosecution of evidence 
favorable to an accused upon 
request violates due process." 
Id. at 37, 702 A.2d at 708 
(quoting Brady at 87). In its 
deciSion, the court explained 
that the defendant can establish 
a Brady violation by 
demonstrating that the State 
had withheld material evidence 
that was favorable to the 
accused, that could either be 
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used for the mitigation of a 
sentence, or for the 
impeachment of a witness. Id. 
at 38, 702 A.2d at 708 (citing 
United States v. Bagley, 473 U. 
S. 667,674-78 (1985); Giglio v. 
United States, 405 U. S. 150, 
153-54 (1972); Brady, 373 U. S. 
at 87). The court explained that 
if the State had "evidence highly 
probative" of the innocence of 
the accused in his file, "he 
should be presumed to 
recognize its significance." Id. 
at 38, 702 A.2d at 708 (quoting 
United States v. Agurs, 427 U. 
S. 97,110 (1976). 
The court discussed the 
three elements of a Brady 
violation: suppression of 
evidence by the state; favorable 
to the accused; and materiality. 
Id. at 38, 702 A.2d at 708. The 
court began by explaining that 
the defendant's assertion that 
evidence was suppressed by 
the State did not relieve Ware 
from making an attempt to find 
the evidence through diligent 
investigation. Id. at 39, 702 
A.2d 708 (citing Hoke v. 
Netherland, 92 F.3d 1350, 1355 
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, -U. S. -, 
117 S.Ct. 630, 136 L.Ed.2d 548 
(1996); United States v. Payne, 
63 F.3d 1200, 1208 (2d Cir. 
1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 
1056, 134 L.Ed.2d 201 (1996)). 
Next, the court noted that 
evidence that could be used to 
impeach one of the State's 
witnesses should be disclosed, 
since it could be favorable to the 
accused. Id. at 41, 702 A.2d at 
709 (citing Marshall v. State, 
346 Md. 186, 198, 695 A.2d 
184, 190 (1997)). The court 
said that "an agreement or 
understanding between the 
witness and the State need not 
be formal or detailed to come 
within the prosecutor's duty to 
disclose" Id. at 41, 702 A.2d at 
709 (citing Reutter v. Solem, 
888 F.2d 578, 582 (8th 
Cir.1989); United States v. 
Shaffer, 789 F.2d 682,690 (9th 
Cir.1986)). 
Finally, the court addressed 
the materiality requirement. The 
court noted that it had discussed 
the materiality of Brady material 
in State v. Thomas, 525 Md. 
160,190,599 A.2d 1171,1185 
(1992). Ware, 348 Md. at 45, 
702 A.2d 711. In Ware, the 
court explained that the 
Supreme Court had recently 
applied the reasonable 
probability test from Strickland v. 
Washington,466 U. S. 668, 694 
(1984), to determine whether 
the suppression of evidence by 
the State was so prejudicial that 
a new trial was required. Ware, 
at 44-45, 702 A.2d 711 (citing 
Bagley, 473 U. S. at 682). The 
standard for whether evidence 
was material was if its 
"suppression undermines 
confidence in the outcome of 
the trial." Id. at 47, 702 A.2d at 
712 (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 
434). 
The court then applied these 
principles to Ware's case. First, 
the court concluded that Ware 
had made specific requests for 
evidence, and that the State had 
not responded adequately. Id. 
at 48, 702 A.2d at 713. The 
court did not accept the State's 
argument that the information 
was available in the court files, 
and found that the State had 
mislead Ware by telling him that 
they had nothing to disclose. Id. 
at 49, 702 A.2d at 713. The 
court stated that "evidence of 
agreements or deals with 
witnesses often provides 
powerful impeachment evidence 
against a witness and enables a 
defendant to attack the motive 
or bias of a witness who might 
otherwise appear to have no 
motive to falsify or color his 
testimony." Id. at 50,702 A.2d 
at 714 (citing Giglio v. United 
States, 405 U. S. 150, 154-55 
(1972)). 
The court also held that 
because Anderson was such a 
central witness in the case, his 
testimony was very material in 
the case. Id. at 51-52, 702 A.2d 
at 715. The court noted that 
Anderson was the only one who 
heard the gunshots. Id. at 52, 
702 A.2d at 715. His testimony 
could have been impeached at 
Ware's trial because he stated 
that he heard three shots. At 
his sentence modification 
hearing, prior to Ware's trial, he 
stated that he heard two shots. 
Id. at 52-53, 702 A.2d at 715. 
The court concluded that, 
considering the impact that 
Anderson's possible testimony 
on cross-examination could 
have had on the jury, the Brady 
violation was sufficient to 
undermine the confidence in the 
outcome of the trial. Id. at 54, 
702 A.2d 716 .. 
Even though the court found 
that a new trial was warranted 
based solely on the State's 
Brady violation, the court 
addressed Ware's other issues 
in order to assist the trial court 
on remand. The court found 
that the trial court had given the 
proper jury instruction for the 
death sentence, pursuant to 
Maryland Rule 4-343(e). Id. at 
58,702 A.2d at 718. The court 
also held that the Division of 
Parole and Probation did not 
violate Maryland Code Article 
41, Section 4-609(d) (1957, 
1997 Repl.vol.), by accepting 
victim impact statements from 
the State for use in Ware's pre-
sentence investigation. Id. at 
63, 702 A.2d at 720 (citing 
Williams v. State, 342 Md. 724, 
679 A.2d 1106 (1996)). Next, 
the court held that the trial court 
had correctly decided that Ware 
had failed to lay the foundation 
for demonstrative evidence 
before introducing it. Id. at 66, 
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702 A.2d at 722 (citing 
Grandison v. State, 305 Md. 
685, 732, 506 A.2d 580, 603 
(1986)). Finally, the court held 
that the trial court did not err by 
allowing the State to cross-
examine a witness to show his 
bias and interest. Id. at 68 702 
A.2d at 723. 
Ware v. State gives notice to 
State's Attorneys that they 
should disclose any 
communications with a witness 
that could be used to impeach 
that witness, as Brady material. 
The State cannot use the 
excuse that the material is part 
of public record, but must tell the 
defendant about it, if it could be 
favorable to the accused. The 
court also gave instructions to 
the lower court in the areas of 
the death penalty, victim impact 
statements, demonstrative 
evidence, and impeachment 
evidence. Ware is primarily a 
reminder to the State to disclose 
any Brady material that might be 
favorable to the accused. 
However the court gave the 
State a small victory by 
permitting it to provide victim 
impact statements to the 
Division of Parole and Probation 
for use in the pre-sentence 
report. 
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